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Abstract 
The paper builds on recent research that challenges common political assessments of 
Vietnam and Cambodia. It examines the correct analytical positioning of donor support for 
civil society in the two countries. By arguing that references to the ‘state’ should, when 
conceptually clarified, include such political activities (by donors) this allows for better 
understanding of the effects of the quite different donor strategies in the two countries. By 
discussing the question of sovereignty the paper argues that the weakness of civil society in 
Vietnam is linked to the weakness of state agency, and vice versa in Cambodia. The paper 
concludes that donors’ analyses should have (and in Vietnam did not) taken fuller account of 
the positive effects of support for civil society upon state strength.  
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Introduction  
Analysis of Cambodian and Vietnamese politics since their re-emergence to integration into 
global markets has not until recently tended to the comparative. The countries are usually 
viewed as very different, with dissimilar histories, political cultures and social norms.
1
 Three 
recent provocative studies, however, suggest the value of comparison, driven by arguments 
that challenge common views.  
The literature on Vietnam, generally and widely seen as politically stable, with a 
developmentally-focused ruling Communist Party, has very often attributed success to a 
combination of good policy, political stability and various contextual factors such as a hard-
working population and ready participation in powerful Asian growth processes. Martin 
Gainsborough, however, in a tightly-argued article, denies any links between political action 
there and policy differences; rather, politics is all about the division of spoils [Gainsborough 
2007].  By contrast, Cambodia has generally been seen as a country that has failed any 
reasonable test of political development, mired in corruption and deeply authoritarian. Yet, 
bearing in mind her rapid economic growth over the past decade or so, analysts are starting 
to develop arguments that Cambodia’s polity is both stable and increasingly capable of 
supporting continued economic growth [Scopis 2012]
2
.  Rhetorically, Vietnam is allegedly a 
‘land without a king’, whilst Cambodia is not.
3
  
Landau, in an overtly comparative study, contrasts the situation in the two countries. In 
Cambodia, she sees a clear “legally protected realm for civil society and where there are 
clear contestations and clashes between competing ideologies and interest groups over the 
nature and boundaries of the Cambodian state”. However, in Vietnam she observes a 
situation “where the boundaries between state and society are associatively, as well as 
conceptually, ill-defined and elusive and the most important contestations often occur 
within the state “[Landau 2007]. 
Such views link to wider discussions of the possibilities (and limitations) of such phenomena 
as ‘authoritarian consolidation’ (see for example Goebel 2011) where elites may obtain a 
                                                          
1
 In the 1980s various academic conferences looked at ‘Indochina’, linking Laos, Vietnam and 
Cambodia through their common communist regimes, albeit that these were very different, but since 
then comparison has been very limited.  
2
 See Scopis 2012 chapter 3 for a discussion of the emerging literature discussing Cambodia’s 
apparent political stability.  
3
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broader and less costly range of options to address political challenges by governing through 
regulation and the management of discourse rather than through coercion [Goebel 2011:1].  
Since the early 1990s both countries have seen major interventions by Western donors. As 
China has become more powerful her presence has increasingly been felt in the region. 
Western influence is an important issue, and one amongst a range of forces driving and 
explaining donor activities.  
The lines of argument presented by the studies mentioned above engage with two 
important analytical issues.  
First is the question of the correct analytical positioning of international support for civil 
society in both countries. By arguing that references to the ‘state’ should, when conceptually 
clarified, include such political activities (by donors) this allows for a far better understanding 
of the effects of quite different strategic engagements by donors in the two countries. To 
simplify, Cambodia saw a donor engagement strategy that supported (materially and in 
terms of attention) emergence of Landau’s “legally protected realm”, whilst Vietnam did 
not. Rhetorically, had the equivalent of the tens of millions of dollars spent by donors on 
Cambodian local NGOs and their embryonic equivalents been spent in Vietnam, things 
would have by now been very different. Although this paper does not address the question 
as to why these two trajectories were so different, this does not appear in any sense to have 
been necessary, rather the outcome of donor strategy and various personal career decisions 
in both countries.   
Second is the question of sovereignty. In this paper this question – the question of 
sovereignty - is understood as the issue of the presence (or otherwise), and its nature, of an 
idealized ‘authority above all others’ within these countries’ polities to which society and 
state may refer. This paper develops a line of argument that links discussion of civil society 
to ideas about sovereignty in the work of Hinsley. This permits an argument that analytically 
the weakness of civil society in Vietnam should be necessarily linked to the weakness of 
state agency, and vice versa in Cambodia. The comparative perspective is here interesting, 
not least as the implications of the research mentioned above confounds much standard 
thinking. Therefore, it is wise to reflect on this issue of sovereignty.   
The paper therefore concludes that the strategic direction taken by donors has 
consequences, that these are important, and that therefore a suitable analytical framework 
is needed to guide such strategic decisions. This framework should have (and in Vietnam did 
not) taken fuller account of the effects of support for civil society upon state strength, given 
 
4
that what seems to have happened is that an assumption of state strength was itself 
overdone, and that lack of social development weakened the possibilities for the 
development of political authority.
4
 
Analytical issues 
Positioning donor activities as part of local politics 
The paper argues that the central analytical issue is to secure some clear way of 
understanding how the politics of civil society (CS) organization may involve (and so can be 
understood in such terms) participation in political processes, including but not limited to 
the creation and maintenance of order in their particular context. CS issues should not be 
separated from the big political picture, and that picture should not assume that apparent 
political order reflects fundamental political stability. There is in the case of Vietnam a 
substantial literature arguing that the successful transition from plan to market was not the 
result of conscious policy at all [de Vylder and Fforde 1996 and 1997]. Conversely, the 
equivalent literature on Cambodia has found it extremely hard to accept that, despite 
apparent policy weaknesses, economic growth since the early ‘noughties’ could have been 
as fast as it has been. 
5
 At the core of these tangles is the question of agency, and the extent 
to which there is a state that is ‘doing development’.  
Here the tension between realist and constructivist approaches mirrors issues in the 
practicalities of donor intervention. So we find different understandings, of course, of how 
the term ‘political’ should be used, and also what it is taken to mean. Thus, CS organisation 
often involves activities that may be labelled political, both analytically and politically, and so 
arguably involved with the business of ‘the state’, but at the same time, using commonly 
accepted empirics, are rather easily said not to be part of ‘the state’.  This may give donors 
room for manoeuvre under trying conditions. Thus, one might say, they are political without 
being political, which may well be tactically useful, or constraining, or something else 
entirely.   
Thus, this being about politics, such frameworks are illuminated by the warning of Dunn 
[Dunn 2000] about terms such as ‘the state’.  
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 See Fforde 2009 and 2001. But see Wischermann 2010 arguing that much of what passes for civil 
society organisation in Vietnam has highly authoritarian norms and attitudes.  
5
 For example, USDA 2010 and Sjoberg and Sjoeholm 2006.  
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Each of these two conceptions (the state as sociological fact and the state as normative 
political proposal) must relate in some way to most of the entities which we now call 
states, but neither makes quite clear how to apply it in practice. [Dunn 2000:69]   
Coping with analytical frameworks that should be able to illuminate these issues requires 
some deeper understanding of how these frameworks do what they do. Problems here stem 
to a large degree from tensions created by the ways in which contestation over various 
important terms (especially ‘state’ and ‘power’) blur boundaries that are – this blurring 
notwithstanding - of considerable importance to many actors (both political actors and 
analysts). Central here are three questions:  
How does one address the empirical issues associated with attempts to use the term CS in 
trying to understand politics in the two countries?  
A good reason for this is that the term CS is used within a complex debate in different ways, 
and that this suggests that it is an ‘essentially contested concept’ with meaning close to that 
offered by the inventor of the term ‘essentially contested concept’ [Gallie 1956, also Kekes 
1977]. Whilst many analyses argue that they themselves are ‘right’, and others ‘wrong’, an 
important suggestion made by Gallie is that such differences should not necessarily be taken 
as indicative, of themselves, that one or more parties in the debate are being unreasonable. 
As the paper discusses further below, this allows for a perspective on analytical frameworks 
that copes with the familiar combination of shared terms and contested meanings.  
How does one manage the analytical question of how to position CS activities within the 
Cambodian and Vietnamese political communities? Here also arises the particular question 
of local NGO (LNGO) and international NGO (INGO) organization.  
It is clear that a large part of the debate on CS organization relates to political action of 
various forms. INGO decisions to fund or not to fund activities, usually those of LNGOs, the 
roles played by official aid donors (bilaterals and multilaterals) who have tended to provide 
most their funds, and negotiations amongst these parties, may all be fitted into a variety of 
definitions of political activity, but this fits badly with analytical approaches that adopt state-
society frameworks. As the paper will argue, we may here refer to insights from scholars 
such as Mitchell, arguing that references to ‘the state’ are best seen, given the typically 
blurred boundaries, as epiphenomenal. Viewing ‘the state’ rather, as Mitchell suggests, as an 
effect of certain techniques of rule, as part of sources of order, means that focusing upon 
those techniques or rule enables us to treat LNGO and INGO activity as part of evolving 
issues of political power, its production, reproduction and exploitation. This could be said to 
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be expanding the concept of the state to include various CS activities, but this produces a 
confusing language.
6
  
The paper argues that analyses of CS activity may usefully be seen as revealing how CS 
activities are useful indicators of politics and political activity.   
In addition, a closely related final question:  
How does one cope analytically with pressures to treat civil society as a definable realm, 
linked to debates about its autonomous (or not) character in any particular instance?  
This, arguably, is illuminated by the treatment of CS as an ‘essentially contested concept’, 
allowing us to appreciate how such pressures (and their opposition) may be seen politically.   
In discussing analytical frameworks for understanding the politics of CS organization, we may 
also draw upon the idea, valid in both countries, that important political actors have been 
thinking about CS and its wider implications strategically.
7
 By this is meant that politics has 
been about how the ‘rules of the game’ may evolve and change, and how the existing ‘rules 
of the game’ influence what may be done in the here and now. This may then be related to 
the question of sovereignty, understood as the question of the presence (or otherwise), and 
its nature, of an idealized ‘authority above all others’ within these countries’ polities to 
which society and state may refer.  
The paper turns now to consider what Hinsley has to say about sovereignty. A great 
analytical advantage of his views are that they may be applied to situations where for 
whatever reason relations between rulers and governed are such that sovereignty, as a 
political issue, remain unresolved; therefore, this analytical framework may be applied (if 
conditions are suitable) to situations where sovereignty is either weak or non-existent.  
CS politics and the issue of sovereignty    
From Hinsley we may take the idea that political communities historically (and so to a 
certain extent necessarily) come to the belief that there should be domestic sovereignty 
through tensions in the debates about relations between those who are governed and those 
who govern. Here precisely the value of the CS debate in both countries is that, in different 
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 See Wischermann 2010 arguing that it is less confusing to treat CS as the certain characteristics of 
action, rather than as a discrete ‘realm’.  
7
 As a consultant, working in the sector in the late ‘noughties’, it was clearly to me that views within 
the VCP were organizations such as School Councils, if actively democratic, would threaten Party rule 
precisely in that they would increase the power of CS. Money (bribes, access to real estate deals etc.) 
could overcome this, but rather a lot would have been needed, more than was available.  
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ways, it adds to discussions of their evolving political orders by, as is central to such debates, 
injecting into politics important issues that engage powerfully with questions of relations 
between governed and government whilst posing sharp questions about the effectiveness of 
state power.  
Here the ‘developmental’ agenda can be seen having powerful discursive effects, both 
potentially and actually, since this agenda place policy to the fore. It is policy that is argued 
to be crucial to the success or failure of national development, and policy requires the firm 
exercise of domestic sovereignty.  
Donors are therefore deeply unhappy when there appears to be a ‘failed state’, or some 
other situation where domestic sovereignty, the prerequisite for policy in the classic sense 
(Fforde 2009), appears absent or weak.  
From Lukes (2005) the paper takes the idea that it is useful (both analytically and politically) 
to think of power as having three dimensions: not only a first dimension to do with what 
‘deciding what will be done’, and also not only a second dimension to do with ‘deciding what 
will not be part of the agenda’, but also that third dimension that pulls the whole thing up by 
its bootstraps, to do with ‘deciding what may be thought doable’.    
The value of comparison: Vietnam and Cambodia 
Across a number of dimensions, in the matter of the politics of civil society organization the 
two countries appear as diametric opposites: though perhaps, like some siblings, this may be 
precisely how similar issues rub antagonistically together to provoke useful reflections on 
similarities. Certainly, of all the generalizations found in the unhappy world of nationalisms, 
frequent Cambodian dislike of ‘the Vietnamese’, and a not uncommon Vietnamese sense of 
somewhat puzzled confusion at how people could be quite so ‘ungrateful’, are matters 
familiar to many of us when we think of ourselves in common sense terms rather than as 
‘analysts’. 
First, given the apparently clear developmental thrust of Vietnamese Communism, and the 
apparently clear architecture of rule associated with its rule, how and why do we find 
ourselves facing the need to explain arguments of sustained failure to deal with policy 
problems such as education and health reform, corruption and that tangle of issues 
commonly associated with transition to and through ‘middle income status’? [Fforde 2004; 
2005; 2012] How can one also cope with arguments that whilst these issues may point 
analyses to consider whether fundamental issues confront Vietnamese politics, because they 
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can be construed to amount to a ‘crisis of authority’, the reverse may appear from 
considerations of Cambodian politics? If this debate is then further developed to include 
consideration of CS organization, can this (and if so how) imply that there is something 
about CS organization within the Cambodian political community that is part of evolving 
power relations within which issues of hierarchy and political authority are more coherent 
and less tense than in Vietnam. Granted this, what may this imply about the politics of CS 
organization within Vietnamese politics and how this, in some way or another, is associated 
with incoherence in hierarchy and political authority.  
Second, given the very different historical trajectories relatable to CS issues in the two 
countries, what does re-examination of these gain from analysis of the politics of CS 
organization here and now?  
A puzzle here is the ways we may understand the very different accounts of the years 
immediately after each country ‘returned to openness to the West’ – largely, the 1990s 
(though precise dates are of course contentious). If we hypothesize that Western 
engagement was important in both countries, then we need to accept that this was very 
different.  
In caricature, donors and INGOs together in Cambodia appear to have pushed hard for 
relationships with ‘new’ structures - the ‘money chasing NGOs’ phase. Existing formal 
structures are largely absent from narratives we can find that illuminate these processes.
8
 
There are different accounts of what caused this, as we would expect. However, a range of 
analyses clearly does not find it hard to argue in various ways that there is something to 
study, and to take seriously, in these ‘spaces’.  
By contrast, donors and INGOs in Vietnam appear to have followed strategies that did not 
open up new space for CS organization. By contrast with the CS debate in Cambodia, it is 
formal structures that we read about, and informal structures are largely absent from 
narratives. 
It is the politics of CS organization that is crucial, although perhaps neither agreed nor 
obvious exactly why. To understand this we need to include donor activities when we think 
about policy and political development: in a naïve sense, this makes them part of the local 
state, in a proper analytical sense, though this has for obvious political reason to be denied 
(not least to maintain the charade of external sovereignty). We also need to consider the 
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interactions between society and government that Hinsley’s approach to sovereignty place 
centrally.      
Let us return now to a discussion of ways one may use CS as an ‘essentially contested 
concept’. This makes it easier to understand the political space open to donors and others 
intervening in ways that may be related to CS.  
Civil society as an ‘essentially contested concept’ 
Just as the phrase ‘multiple truths’ reveals much about the field of contest, so the notion of 
‘essentially contested concepts’ is itself useful to understanding what is going on. As we shall 
see, this alludes to, and so need not necessarily directly engage with, matters of power as 
well as of overt political action. This is of obvious utility in a wide variety of situations.  
Gallie (1956) presents his argument in terms that suggest necessity; that is, his discussion of 
various concepts implies that they have some essential meaning. We do not need to get too 
hung up about this, treating his ideas as contextual when we want to. He suggests, and 
these proposals seem usefully applied to the CS debate, that some terms qua concepts have 
the following characteristics [Gallie 1956: 171 et seq] and so are ‘essentially contested’: 
First - “appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement” 
[171]. It seems quite clear that CS is generally, whether overtly or not, used in such ways, 
which is of course part of its power and attractiveness. Thus:  
Witness the tragedy that has befallen the proponents of the concept: people struggling 
against authoritarian regimes had demanded civil society; what they got instead was 
NGOs! [Chandhoke 2007:608] 
Second, “This achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that its worth 
is attributed to it as a whole” [171-2]. It seems quite clear that references to CS in the 
literature differ with reference to assertions and discussions that platform on the idea that 
CS, and its contexts, are complex. One thinks here of the different elements said to make up 
CS ‘action’ (Wischermann 2010; this volume), discussions of the meanings of ‘relative 
autonomy’, and so on.  
Third, thus, “the accredited achievement is initially variously describable” [172]. Here Gallie 
appears to be asserting that for him a crucial aspect of an ECC is that there are no great 
pressures to force agreement on one particular way of describing how the internal 
complexity of the concept should be dealt with. Contestation, thus, happens.  
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Fourth, “The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable 
modification … {that} cannot be predicted in advance” [172]. Is this sense, contestation thus 
not only happens, but can continue. Does anybody expect the CS debate to stop?  
To these four points Gallie adds three more: 
His fifth adds to the idea that there is a social contestation: “… to use an essentially concept 
means to use it against other uses and to recognize that one’s use of it has to be maintained 
against these other uses ... both aggressively and defensively.” [172] 
Finally, to tighten up his position, Gallie adds two final conditions “to distinguish the … 
concept from the kind of concept that can be shown to be … radically confused” [180]. These 
are, first, “the derivation of any such concept from an original exemplar whose authority is 
acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept” and, second, “the probability or 
plausibility … of the claim that the continuous competition for acknowledgement as 
between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original exemplar’s achievement 
to be sustained and/or developed …” [180].  
Noting that definitions of the exemplar may also be contested, this seems to make sense in 
the context of the CS debate, lurking behind many elements of which are shared (often 
somewhat vaguely) narratives of various events, especially those in Eastern Europe in the 
1970s and 1980s [Chandhoke 2007].  
Gallie was writing in the 1950s, when essentialist argument had far greater authority than 
nowadays, at least in scholarly debate. However, his points are useful when assessing 
assertions that there is (and that this should be accepted) a true definition of CS. Rather, we 
can see such assertions in other ways, especially the political. In turn, this allows us to re-
examine crucial claims made in the comparative histories of donor engagement under CS 
headings in Cambodia and Vietnam.  A common reason given by donors in Vietnam in the 
1990s for not putting more resources into emergent local CS activity combined arguments 
that ‘they were not really independent’ with a sense that the Party was ruling effectively and 
policy mattered – the former view was politically inept, the latter highly contestable.
9
 
An early reference to the idea of contested space can be found in Fforde and Porter 1995.  
We favour {an} approach which starts from the assumption that the elusiveness of the 
boundary is a clue to the nature of the phenomenon.  In this view, the distinction 
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 I recall being told by donor experts in the 1990s that informal farmers’ groups were few in number 
and, when they did exist, ‘not truly autonomous’ [Fforde 2008]. 
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between the state and civil society is not best understood as a boundary between and 
around or external to two distinct entities.   Rather, in understanding recent historical 
events in Vietnam, as well as current possibilities, we think it more useful to focus on 
`zones of contest' which develop internally within the network of institutional 
mechanisms through which social and economic order is maintained [Fforde and Porter 
1994:5] 
One can note here that the authors do not state any need a priori to say much about such 
‘zones of contest’. This becomes, therefore, a more empirical question. What this argument 
does, though, is sidestep attempts to argue that too much should be made of terms such as 
‘state’ and rather to look instead at sources of ‘social and economic order’. As already 
mentioned, this risks confounding classic developmental ideas that stress the importance, to 
development, of policy and so the vital importance of its prerequisite, that domestic 
sovereignty lacking in, say, ‘failed states’ [Fforde 2009].
 10
 
Two writers tell us something about frameworks of political analysis useful here. These are 
Mann and Lukes.
11
 
A central issue to developing some persuasive account of the politics of CS organization is 
clearly how to manage the term ‘state’. Useful inputs come from Skocpol 1979, who stresses 
the view that ‘the state’ is not only “an arena in which conflicts over basic social and 
economic interests are fought out” [25].  
Mitchell’s already-mentioned contribution to the literature on ‘the state’ is useful [Mitchell 
1991]. He argues that the boundary between state and society, as observed, is usually 
blurred, suggesting that ‘states’ as observed are an effect of more powerful logics, which he 
calls certain ‘techniques of rule’.  
The state needs to be analyzed as … a structural effect. That is to say, it should be 
examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful metaphysical effect of practices 
that make such structures appear to exist … [Mitchell 1991:94] 
Bearing this in mind, consider the debates about the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state that 
offered a platform to the rediscovery of the state – the ‘bringing the state back in’ that was 
well argued by Skocpol, though many of these ideas have long histories [Skocpol 1979; also 
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 I am well aware that there is a vast literature here, but, in keeping with the goal of the paper– to 
clarify analytical frameworks efficiently – leave this as it is here. It is not hard to research the wider 
literature.  
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Mann 1984, and (usefully) a review by Almond (Almond 1988) that includes a discussion of 
why many had earlier abandoned use of the concept]. Central to these views is the belief 
that understanding political change requires proper analysis of the ways a state may deploy 
particular sorts of power largely unavailable to other actors. This gives her a way of thinking 
where a state has a ‘relative autonomy’ from other political forces. She argues that the state 
is not an ‘arena’, and that positions within it therefore offer the possibility of using those 
powers specific to those positions. For her, these stem from the idea that the state is no 
mere arena:  
It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed by, and 
more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority [Skocpol 1979:29].  
Thus  
The state normally performs two basic functions:  it maintains order, and it competes 
with other actual or potential states [30] 
Given this, one of her intentions is to ensure that analyses pay enough attention to 
differences within those factions, groups or individuals sited within ‘the state’. The tangles 
here appear in part as linguistic. If we expand our sense of ‘the state’ to base it, following 
Mitchell, upon the idea that ‘the state’ – as observed - is better thought of as an effect of 
certain techniques of rule, then we can provide ways for analyses to create space to 
manoeuvre, linking CS organization and practices directly to the politics of rule and 
government, rather than getting necessarily entangled in questions of whether they are or 
are not ‘part of the state’. There is of course a substantial literature arguing that post-
colonial states inherited strong state organisations weakly linked to CS. The argument here is 
that such strength was to a large extent an illusion precisely because of the state of links 
between rulers and ruled. To return to the comparison between Vietnam and Cambodia, the 
suggestion for Vietnam is that victory in 1975 and the apparatus of Soviet rule created the 
illusion of strong rule, whilst for Cambodia the peculiarities of Khmer politics and the chaos 
of the years after 1975 created the illusion of weak rule.  
What Skocpol provides here is a clear view that when one wishes (for whatever reason) to 
discuss the politics of CS organisation in ways that include the activities of NGOs and INGOs, 
then:  
“The state properly conceived is … a set of administrative, policing and military 
organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority” [29] 
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Her particular choice of words is telling.  
It is for us obvious that, when thinking about CS organization in both post-colonial Vietnam 
and Cambodia, this way of thinking allows, if one wishes, a considerable development of the 
concept of ‘the state’. For example, to include, if the analyst wishes (and the audience buys 
it), INGO activities in delivering, through local channels, resources and training. Here of 
course we need to be careful to keep the analysis political, mindful of situations such as that 
in The Philippines where abundant NGOs and INGOs do not seem to accompany great 
popular satisfaction with their government.  
The paper discusses below how such analyses (which the paper does not assert are 
necessary) might benefit from reflections on what has been said about the nature of 
‘power’. Furthermore, Mann’s use of the phrase “more or less” surely resonates strongly 
with many familiar with practical politics of CS organization in both countries, where it 
would be unwise to work on the assumption that there is always a clear “executive 
authority”. Hinsley’s contribution to the discussion is then through ways of thinking about 
how such authority may form under conditions where it is contested or troubled.  
Skocpol’s position is echoed by Mann who in giving a list that gives the ‘four main elements’ 
that the state contains, which he says he will follow, gives as the fourth element “a 
monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making” [Mann 1984:112 – stress in original]. If one 
asks what happens if that monopoly of rule-making is absent, or seen by important political 
groups as questionable, then this is an obvious candidate with a political analysis seeking to 
identify pressures for change. It also may encourage reflection on the domestic sovereignty 
that has already been mentioned.  
As a caveat, note how Hindess argues that it is unwise to use the term as though power 
were some addable quality, so that one may predict outcomes from a calculation of which 
side has ‘the more power’:  
Once the exercise of power is seen as involving the use of definite resources under 
conditions that are not entirely determined by the persons concerned, then it ceases to 
be a capacity to secure one’s preferred objectives. Instead, and at best, it becomes a 
capacity to act in pursuit of those objectives.…  
In view of its glaring deficiencies the most interesting question raised by the quantitative 
conception of power is why it is that so many students of power have been able to take it 
seriously.  
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[Hindess 1996:26]  
If Lukes’ first two dimensions refer to power first to influence decisions,  and second to 
influence what is not to be decided, then his third dimension - “securing the consent to 
domination of willing subjects” [109] – further expands the choices available to the analyst 
and so the need for readers to appreciate what is happening, analytically. One may argue, 
and suggest that one observes, situations where the state creates the preconditions for 
consent; and one may argue and observe situations where driving forces come from the 
governed, not their government. The power of Hinsley’s position is that he focussed upon 
the relationship between rulers and ruled. Returning to the comparison between Vietnam 
and Cambodia, this farming of the question poses intriguing questions. For example, in 
Vietnam, had there been a far greater donor resourcing of local CS activity, what would the 
political implications of the 1997 rural unrest have been? The upheaval in Thai Binh, the 
province for which ‘1997’ is famous but by far the only place where there were ‘hot spots’ 
(diem nong) was treated as contained by the security apparatus, with foreign researchers 
negotiating access to information. Arguably, had far more donor money been in play, this 
could have played out very differently. Framing donor intervention as part of domestic 
politics allows one to see how this narrative imbues the state with considerable power, 
arguably a misreading of Vietnamese politics [Gainsborough op.cit., Fforde 2012].  
At the risk of vast simplification, the choice here pivots on the analysts’ view of the 
necessary nature (or otherwise) of their own analysis. The more necessary the analytical 
framework is asserted to be, the harder it is to manage questions of choice. This is clear in 
discussions of interests, especially of those thought to be weak and relatively powerless, for 
if people apparently do not act in accordance with what the analysis asserts their interests 
to be, there is a need for some variant of ‘false consciousness’ to be introduced, by the 
analyst, into the analysis.
12
 A priori there is probably no need to come down on one side or 
the other of this debate; it is probably healthier to consider this an empirical issue. Analysis 
of the politics of CS organization may assume that people know what their interests are, and 
it may assume that they do not really, and what they believe their interests to be are 
constructed for them (such as by INGOs’ or their political leaders current views of, say,  
‘democracy’).  
Landau 2007 is an example of what can be done with such ideas: 
                                                          
12
 See Lukes 2005 chapter 3 especially his discussion of Scott on pp.124-132.  
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“Gramsci reminded us that civil society is not apolitical and that the realm of civil society, 
just like the political and economic realms, is permeated by ideological, sectoral and 
material interests. He also highlighted the way the state achieves domination and 
legitimation not only through coercive and regulatory means, but also through 
influencing social ideas, values and norms. His conception of the state exercising 
dominance but not hegemony over civil society provides an important clue as to where 
to look for contestations occurring within contemporary Southeast Asia [254] 
She also argues that a major shortcoming of much analysis that uses a realm-based CS 
notion is that:  
{Gramsci’s} perception of civil society as a realm associatively separate from the state 
limits the utility of his theory to Western-style liberal democratic regimes where there is 
a clear institutional, legal and conceptual space for civil society [idem] 
Here one can see clearly the way in which an analysis may avoid the point made by Mitchell 
(that the state is epiphenomenal) by focussing analytically upon contestations over 
boundaries. Thus, we have the analytical question - who says, and how, what the field of 
contest is? This question is powerful in that it should be capable of generating very 
interesting and empirically founded arguments. For example, in both Vietnam and 
Cambodia, what over time were the different effects upon their own engagement 
opportunities of the very different donor decisions to fund LNGOs?  
Sovereignty, relations between rulers and governed, 
and the issue of sovereignty 
Much of the CS debate is closely involved with, if not well within, developmentalist thinking 
and practices. As already mentioned, these tend to take a somewhat mechanistic view of 
change processes, largely as they involve the management and conceptualisation of the 
delivery or resources to seek pre-definable (or at least knowable) outcomes. Development is 
thus ‘done’, is transitive, and therefore tends to give high importance to establishing and 
implementing correct policy as a known means to knowable outcomes [Fforde 2009]. Even if 
LNGOs and INGOs do not really believe this, in that they secure important resources and 
authority from international official donors (who may not actually believe it either), they 
may all need to dance to that tune.  
As already mentioned, in discussing Mann’s view that the state should be thought of as “a 
set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well 
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coordinated by, an executive authority”, one may ask to what extent it make sense (and 
when and where) to think in terms of coherent political authority in sovereign terms.    
To quote Hinsley:  
If we wish to explain why men have thought of power in terms of sovereignty we have 
but to explain why they have assumed that there was a final and absolute authority in 
their society – and why they have not always done so … 
The concept has been formulated when conditions have been emphasizing the 
interdependence between the political society and the more precise phenomenon of its 
government. It has been the source of greatest preoccupation and contention when 
conditions have been producing rapid changes in the scope of government or in the 
nature of society or in both. It has been resisted or reviled – it could not be overlooked – 
when conditions, by producing a close integration between society and government or 
else by producing a gap between society and government, have inclined men to assume 
that government and community are identical or else to insist that they ought to be. In a 
word, the origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the 
nature, the origin and the history of the state.  [Hinsley 1986:1-2, stress added]   
Thus, analyses that investigate the politics of CS organization may include discussions of the 
conformity of otherwise of local politics to the notion that there is some authority that is 
based upon domestic sovereignty in the sense Hinsley uses, and what implications there 
may be, such as for local power relations, if that authority is lacking.  
For example, as we saw in the discussion of Vietnamese CS in the paper above, such 
reflections pose the question, in thinking about CS activities, or whether apparent close 
alignment or relationships with formally official structures (Landau’s “contestations within 
the state”) is worthwhile, as to what happens if advocacy fails in ways attributed to the lack 
of executive authority. For Cambodia, the CS debate rather seems to engage with an existing 
executive authority.  
Fundamentally, for political analyses what seems to come out of this is the value of seeing 
CS organisation as an indicator of relations between rulers and government. Hinsley’s rather 
open analysis allows, if the analysts wishes, links to be made between studies of particular 
CS organisation and the macro-political issue, founded on notions of power and of authority, 
of the extent to which, through the issue of sovereignty, these may be used to link state 
power to government issues: rhetorically, does the state need CS and does CS need the 
state? The argument stresses the importance of understanding the rhetoric here, since, as 
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should now be clear, these terms may be used relatively freely within the overall framework 
of the ‘essentially contested concept’. To repeat a quote from Gallie, such contestations 
involve the need that:  
… the probability or plausibility … of the claim that the continuous competition for 
acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original 
exemplar’s achievement to be sustained and/or developed … [180]. 
Reflections 
It may strike the reader that the paper has to a great extent ignored concepts that are 
central to many analyses of the politics of countries apparently comparable to Vietnam and 
Cambodia. For example, in the development literature much attention is paid to ideas such 
as the developmental state and, if this concept is actually applicable in a particular context, 
whether or not this has implications for legitimisation, or not. One reason that this concept 
has been ignored is the simple one that it seems to assume sovereignty: it takes as given a 
solved political problem, so that the state can be ‘seen to be doing development’.  This 
paper is more interested, following Hindess in a theoretical vein, and analyses such as those 
of Gainsborough more empirically, in thinking about situations that may exist whilst that 
political problem is being solved, that is, before it has been. Thus, whilst analysts may pose 
the question of the actual or potential role of avenues of state legitimisation vis-à-vis civil 
society, this somehow presupposes that the sovereignty issue (in the sense used in this 
paper) has been resolved. What if it has not? In such cases, and surely there are many 
historical examples (as well as what some argue has been happening in Vietnam), in some 
political sense there is nothing, yet, to legitimise. This perhaps helps explain the vacuity of 
many developmentalist arguments about development models and policies, which assume a 
state with authority that is there to receive (say) World Bank advice. Political analysis may 
well retort that the key issue is quite different – not to get policy right, but to make policy 
advice matter, and that is a political issue above all.  
It may well be argued that neither Vietnamese nor Cambodian histories contain much that is 
familiar to Westerners. They draw upon quite alien traditions and cultures. Yet over the past 
couple of centuries, at least, and increasingly from the early 1990s, there have been 
important patterns of engagement and cross-cultural interactions. Frameworks for analysing 
the politics of CS organization thus have some need to find ways of managing such cross-
cultural tangles. This tends to be best served by the use of ‘open’ frameworks of analysis 
that allow a particular analyst a structured freedom to see what they can do with their 
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information and their own positioning. This paper therefore poses the question of 
sovereignty in the way Hinsley does; that is it asks how the question may or may not be 
posed and answered. It does not assume that the question has been answered.  
There are many analytical tangles here, above all in hindsight, where patterns of change 
become central puzzles. One might argue that in Cambodia Khmer Rouge (KR) rule created a 
void that after the end of Vietnamese occupation was only gradually filled in, and that the 
Cambodian People’s Party never had the power of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), 
not least as KR grassroots cadres still survived.  Yet this presumes that the VCP had power, 
and that this power would transfer across easily to the new conditions of a market economy, 
extensive corruption and globalisation. Hinsley’s focus upon sovereignty and its emergence 
as to do with relations between rulers and ruled allows us to go beyond such ways of 
thinking, and to start to understand how the analyses of Gainsborough, Landau and Scopis 
fit into the mainstream debate. It allows us to see how power and authority are dependent 
upon relationships that exist in time, and so how sovereignty may or may not exist and may 
or may not be created, or destroyed: it takes two to tango.   
In terms of ‘non-Western modernities’ [Woodside 2006], perhaps for Vietnam there has 
been a tendency to delusion, amplified by beliefs about Soviet institutions and ‘transitional 
reforms’ (Doi Moi), seeing a strong centralised political authority where, one may argue, 
there has rather been increasing confusion in matters of hierarchy and political ideas. The 
state of CS organisation perhaps indicates this. For Cambodia, the delusion was perhaps 
that, after the violence and the Vietnamese occupation, there was a great weakness of 
political order, so that, through the ‘noughties’, CS organization was thought, politically, to 
be operating in a relative vacuum, when, analyses tend to show, it was not. To quote again 
Landau, things were “clear”, by contrast with Vietnam.  
Conclusions 
The paper has argued that donor strategies in Vietnam and Cambodia show very different 
patterns of engagement with CS. In both cases, it makes sense to view these engagements 
as drawing donors into domestic politics. Further, the paper has argued that this means that 
it is analytically useful to view donors as part of local political processes. Understanding the 
sovereignty issue as a question – that of how relations between rulers and ruled are 
understood locally, and to what extent this creates an imagined ‘authority above all others’, 
the paper contrasts and compares the two countries. It argues that more active donor 
engagement with CS in Cambodia contrasts with preference for working with formal 
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structures in Vietnam and that this may have caused or contributed to the different 
evolutions of the sovereignty issue in the two countries. Specifically, it argues that Cambodia 
may, rhetorically, be called a ‘Land with a King’, and Vietnam a ‘Land without a King’, 
meaning that whilst sovereignty has become clearer and more powerful politically in 
Cambodia, in Vietnam it has eroded badly.   
However, the paper also argues that donors tend to organise in ways that push them to 
assume that ‘there is a King’. This is to do with how mainstream developmentalist thinking 
assumes that development is ‘done’, and marshals policy expertise that requires the 
existence of some agency to adopt and implement policy. That agency is usually assumed to 
be a local state. It therefore assumes, and wants to assume, that the political issues 
associated with the sovereignty question (as the paper understands it) have been resolved. 
Clearly, if they have not been resolved, or are being resolved, this will put donors on the 
wrong foot, probably supporting what, with a better understanding, they would want to 
avoid.  
Much of what has happened in the two countries since the early 1990s has neither been 
what donors have expected not what they have wanted. This paper argues that this is in part 
because donors and their experts have not properly understood in either country either the 
evolving origins of political authority or their own roles therein.  The studies cited at the 
start of the paper start to show the right direction for a better understanding, and so also to 
the mistakes that got us here.  
  
Melbourne 
May 2013 
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